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Abstract—With the emerging of mobile communication tech-
nologies, we are entering the fifth generation mobile commu-
nication system (5G) era. Various application scenarios will
arise in the 5G era to meet the different service requirements.
Different 5G network slicings may deploy different public key
cryptosystems. The security issues among the heterogeneous
systems should be considered. In order to ensure the secure
communications between 5G network slicings, in different pub-
lic cryptosystems, we propose two heterogeneous signcryption
schemes which can achieve mutual communications between
the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the CertificateLess
public key Cryptography (CLC) environment. We prove that our
schemes have the INDistinguishability against Adaptive Chosen
Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2) under the Computational Diffie-
Hellman Problem (CDHP) and the Existential UnForgeability
against adaptive Chosen Message Attack (EUF-CMA) under the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in the random oracle model.
We also set up two heterogeneous cryptosystems on Raspberry
Pi to simulate the interprocess communication between different
public key environments. Furthermore, we quantify and analyze
the performance of each scheme. Compared with the existing
schemes, our schemes have greater efficiency and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the emergence of wireless networks, the Mobile
Internet has experienced explosive growth four times (1G,
2G, 3G, 4G). It has become the foundation of information
networks connecting the human society. The existing tradi-
tional communication services are difficult to adapt to many
application scenarios. Therefore, the fifth generation mobile
communication technology arises at this historic moment. 5G
is a hot spot in global research. In 2012, the European Union
officially launched METIS (mobile and wireless communica-
tions enables for the 2020 information society) project [1]. In
Asia, South Korea started the “GIGA Korea” 5G project [2]
in 2013. Chinese IMT-2020 promotion group and the “863”
plan were also launched in June, 2013 and March, 2014
respectively [3]. Due to 5G services having the advantages
of faster speed, larger capacity, and lower cost, many scholars
all over the world are carrying out a wide range of research
on the candidate frequency bands of 5G communication, the
development of 5G vision, 5G’s application requirements and
key technologies [4], while, at the same time they also raise
more security challenges. People who use 5G’s services face
more extensive and complex security threats.
Since a variety of 5G application scenarios may have
different requirements, 5G network resources are divided into
different network slicings to meet these demands. Dividing the
network can reduce the network operating cost and improve
the efficiency.
A. Network Slicing
The 5G system is composed of three layers shown as
follows. They correlate to each other through the entities of
network layout [5]:
• Infrastructure Resource Layer: Through virtualization
principles, the physical resources of the fixed and mobile
convergence network are exposed to the orchestration
entity. These resources are composed of access nodes,
cloud nodes, 5G devices, network nodes and related links.
• Business Enablement Layer: All the functions of the
convergence network should be constructed in a modular
form and documented to the database. The functions of
the software module and the configuration parameters of
the specific network parts can be downloaded from the
resource database.
• Business Application Layer: This layer deploys the spe-
cific applications and services in 5G network [6].
In 2015, Ericsson proposed that 5G systems would be built
to logical network slicings, which can enable operators to
meet the wide range of users demands. The network slicings
are also called the “5G network slicings”. They comprise
a group of network functions, resources, connection rela-
tionships and typically covering multiple technical domains
including terminals, access networks, etc. Through the virtual
independent logic network infrastructure, the 5G network
slicings technology provide an isolated network environment
for different applications. In this way, a wide variety of
scenarios can be customized according to the demands of net-
work functions and characteristics. Different network slicings
include different proprietary networks with separate logics. A
5G slicing is composed of various functions and specific Radio
Access Technology (RAT) sets [7]. It can span all domains of
the network: software modules running on the cloud, specific
put forward 
requirements
Business 
Requirement
Operator
Network 
Operator
Template 
Library 
match 
template
Service 
Engine
import 
template
request 
resources
Resource 
Platform
make it entitative
5G slice 1
Mobile Internet
5G slice 2
Vehicle Network
5G slice 3
Internet of things IoT
allocate 
resources
Fig. 1. The system architecture of 5G
configurations of the transport network supporting flexible and
accurate positioning, dedicated radio configurations, ect. The
specific application scenarios or business models can decide
the utilization forms of network functions and the compound
modes of RAT sets.
Via the virtualization technology, network infrastructure re-
sources are virtualized into a number of proprietary networks
according to the requirements of specific applications. Slic-
ings can customize network functions and manage network
resources based on different business scenarios [8]. Each
network slicing can be abstracted as a logical network formed
by the collection of network functions and their correspond-
ing configurations [9]. These logical networks (different 5G
slicings) can provide network services accordingly.
There are three steps in a slicing’s life cycle: the creation,
the management, and the revocation. As shown in Fig. 1, the
business requirement operator puts forward requirements to
the network operator, upon receiving these requirements, the
network operator matches the network slicing template ac-
cording to the requirements of the business scenario. A slicing
template contains the network function components required,
the component interaction interfaces, and the description of the
network resources. When the template is imported, the service
engine can apply for network resources from the resource
platform. After acquiring the resources, the service engine
can use them to achieve virtual network functions and make it
entitative [10]. Fig. 1 shows that 5G network slicings could be
the Mobile Internet, Internet of Vehicles, Internet of Things,
etc.
B. Related Work
In a traditional PKI cryptosystem, there is a Certification
Authority (CA) that issues public key certificates for each
user and binds certificates with their identities. However, as
the number of users increases, this method uses a great deal
of time and storage space in certificate management. In order
to solve this problem, Identity-Base Cryptosystem (IBC) [11]
was proposed by Shamir in 1984. In IBC, users’ public keys
are their identities and private keys are generated by Key
Generation Centers (KGC). However, it leads another issue
of key escrow; because of this issue, some key management
schemes have been proposed to address this problem [12, 13].
In [14], CLC was also introduced to solve this problem in
which the private key is formed by two parts. One problem
is the secret value of the user’s choice and the other is the
partial private key issued by KGC. Hence, KGC has no way
to get the full private key, so the key escrow problem is solved
effectively.
In order to achieve confidentiality, integrity, authentication
and nonrepudiation simultaneously, a traditional approach is
first to sign a message and then to encrypt it, called the
signature-then-encryption approach. For the sake of opti-
mizing algorithm and improving efficiency, the concept of
signcryption [15] was first introduced by Zheng 1997, and the
formal security model of signcryption [16] was first proposed
in 2002. Signcryption is a new cryptographic primitive that
fulfills the functions of digital signature and public key
encryption in a single logical step, at a cost significantly lower
than that required by the traditional signature-then-encryption
approach. Although some signcryption schemes based on PKI
or CLC [17, 18] were proposed in the past few years, they
are only suitable for homogeneous environments. Research on
heterogeneous communications has been considered by schol-
ars around the world, in order to facilitate communications
[19, 20, 21]. Similarly, in the 5G system, different network
slicings may deploy different public cryptosystems. In order
to ensure the secure communications between 5G network
slicings over different public key systems, we put forward
two innovative mutual heterogeneous signcryption schemes.
In 2010, Sun et al. proposed a heterogeneous signcryption
scheme between PKI and IBC [22] and discussed it in the
multi receiver setting, however their scheme could only resist
outside attacks, and it did not satisfy the non-repudiation. In
2011, Huang et al. [23] proposed a heterogeneous signcryption
scheme for PKI-to-IBC that can achieve the insider security.
Regardless, it only permits a sender in the IBC to transmit
a message to a receiver in the PKI and does not provide
the mutual communications. In 2013, Li et al. [24] proposed
two signcryption schemes that provided bidirectional commu-
nication between PKI and IBC. This scheme relied on the
cumbersome pairing operations which lead to the inefficiency.
In 2016, Li et al. [25] proposed a heterogeneous signcryption
to design an access control scheme without certificates. In
2017, a concrete heterogeneous signcryption scheme of IBC-
to-CLC was presented in [26]. In the same year, Wang et
al. [27] proposed an IBC-to-PKI heterogeneous signcryption
scheme in the standard model.
In this paper, we propose two mutual heterogeneous sign-
cryption schemes between PKI and CLC public cryptosystems
named PCHS (PKI-CLC Heterogeneous Signcryption) and
CPHS (CLC-PKI Heterogeneous Signcryption). When the
users in the 5G slicing based on PKI environment (such as
a Mobile Internet slicing) try to communicate with the users
in the 5G slicing based on CLC (such as a Vehicle Internet
slicing), they can use the PCHS scheme to establish a secure
communication, if in the opposite case, the CPHS scheme can
be used.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. We introduce
the preliminary work e.g. the generic signcryption model and
the complexity assumptions in Section II. Then, we propose
two efficient mutual heterogeneous signcryption schemes in
Section III. The security analysis of the proposed schemes are
given in Section IV. The performance is evaluated in Section
V. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A heterogeneous signcryption scheme generally consists of
the following five algorithms:
Setup: This is a probabilistic algorithm running by Private
Key Generator (PKG). It inputs a security parameter l, and
outputs the system parameters and the master key. PKG
publishes the system parameters while keeping the master key
s in secret.
PKI-KG: This is a key generation algorithm for PKI users.
Each user chooses his/her private key SKp and publishes the
public key PKp.
CLC-KG: This is a key generation algorithm for CLC users.
• Partial Private Key Extract: The user inputs the system
parameters, the master key s and his/her identity ID,
PKG outputs the partial private key d and transmits it to
the user in a secure way.
• Set Secret Value: The user inputs an identity ID, and
outputs a secret value xc.
• Private Key Extract: The user inputs a partial private key
d and a secret value xc, and outputs a full private key
SKc.
• Public Key Extract: The user inputs an identity ID and
the secret value xc, and outputs a public key PKc.
Signcrypt: This is a probabilistic signcryption algorithm
running by a sender. It takes a messagem, the sender’s private
key SKp and a receiver’s public key PKc, then outputs the
ciphertext σ.
Unsigncrypt: This is a deterministic unsigncryption algo-
rithm running by a receiver. It takes the ciphertext σ, the
sender’s public key PKp and the receiver’s secret key SKc.
Then, it outputs the plaintext m, or the symbol ⊥ if σ is an
invalid ciphertext between the specific sender and receiver.
A. Bilinear Pairings
The bilinear pairing namely Weil pairing or Tate pairing
of algebraic curves is defined as a map e : G1 × G1 → G2.
Here, G1 is a cyclic additive group of a large prime order q.
P is a generator of G1. G2 is a cyclic multiplicative group of
the same order q. Let a and b be elements in Z∗q . A bilinear
pairing has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: Let e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab, ∀P,Q ∈ G1
and a, b ∈ Z∗q . This can be related as ∀P,Q, S ∈ G1,
e(P + Q,S) = e(P, S)e(Q,S) and e(P,Q + S) =
e(P,Q)e(P, S).
• Nondegeneracy: There exist P,Q ∈ G1, such that
e (P,Q) 6= 1G2 . Here, 1G2 denotes the identity element
of G2.
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
e (P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
B. Complexity Assumptions
The security of our schemes relies on the hardness of the
following problems.
G1 is a cyclic additive group of a large prime order q. P
is a generator of G1.
Definition 1. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
(CDHP): Given an instance (P, aP, bP ) ∈ G1, for any
a, b ∈ Z∗q , it is difficult to compute abP ∈ G1.
Definition 2. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given an
instance (P, aP ) ∈ G1, it is difficult to compute the integer
a ∈ Z∗q .
We assume there are two types of adversaries with different
capabilities. The Type I adversary can replace users’ public
keys, but it does not know the master secret key s. The Type
II adversary can access the master secret key s, but can not
replace users’ public keys.
III. PROPOSED SCHEMES
In this section, we assume that a 5G Mobile Internet slicing
is in PKI public cryptosystem, and a 5G Vehicle Internet slic-
ing is in CLC public cryptosystem. We propose two efficient
signcryption schemes for the security authentication between
the two heterogeneous 5G slicings. The first scheme PCHS
allows users in PKI cryptosystem to signcrypt the messages
and send them to users in CLC cryptosystem. Upon receiving
these signcrypted messages, the users in CLC cryptosystem
can decrypt and verify them. The second scheme CPHS is the
inverse of PCHS. The detailed processes are shown in Fig. 2
and Fig. 3.
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A. PCHS
The PCHS is described as follows:
Setup: Given a security parameter l, PKG chooses a cyclic
additive group G1 of a large prime order q. P is a generator
of G1. Then, PKG defines three cryptographic hash functions:
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 → Z∗q , H2 : {0, 1}
n × G1 → Z∗q ,
and H3 : G1 → {0, 1}n. PKG selects a master secret
key s ∈ Z∗q randomly and computes the master public
key Ppub = sP . Then, it publishes system parameters
{G1, P, Ppub, n, l,H1, H2, H3} and keeps the master key s
secret.
PKI-KG: A user in PKI cryptosystem chooses a random
number xp ∈ Z∗q as his/her private key skp and computes
1
xp
P as his/her public key PKp.
CLC-KG:
• Partial Private Key Extract: PKG randomly selects t ∈
Z∗q and computes T = tP , γ = H1(ID, T ), and d =
t + sγ ∈ Z∗q . Then, PKG sends d and T to the user
securely. d is the user’s partial private key.
• Set Secret Value: The user randomly chooses xc ∈ Z∗q
as his/her secret value.
• Private Key Extract: The user sets his/her full private key
as skc = (xc, d).
• Public Key Extract: The user sets his/her public key as
PKc = (T, PKc1 = xcP ).
Signcrypt: The user in PKI cryptosystem uses his/her
private key skp and the receiver’s public key PKc in CLC
cryptosystem to signcrypt a message m as follows:
1) Choose a number k ∈ Z∗q randomly.
2) Compute R1 = kP , h = H2(m,R1), R2 = hP .
3) Compute c = m⊕H3(R2).
4) Compute u = (h− k)skp.
5) Compute V = kPKc1 + T + γPpub.
The ciphertext is σ = (c, u, V ).
Unsigncrypt: The user in CLC cryptosystem uses his/her
private key skc and the sender’s public key PKp in PKI
cryptosystem to unsigncrypt the ciphertext σ = (c, u, V ) as
follows:
1) Compute R1 =
1
xc
(V − dP ).
2) Compute R2 = R1 + uPKp.
3) Compute m = c⊕H3(R2).
4) Compute h = H2(m,R1).
5) Accept the message if and only if R1 = hP − uPKp,
return ⊥ otherwise.
Now we verify the correctness of the PCHS.
Firstly:
1
xc
(V − dP )
= 1
xc
(kPKc1 + T + γPpub − dP )
= 1
xc
(kxcP + tP + γsP − dP )
= 1
xc
(kxcP + dP − dP )
= 1
xc
· kxcP
= kP = R1
Secondly:
R1 + uPKp
= R1 + (h− k)skp ·
1
xp
P
= kP + (h− k)xp ·
1
xp
P
= kP + hP − kP
= hP = R2
Finally:
hP − uPKp
= hP − (h− k)xp ·
1
xp
P
= hP − hP + kP
= kP = R1
B. CPHS
In CPHS, the Setup, PKI-KG and CLC-KG algorithms are
the same as PCHS. And CPHS can be described as follows:
Signcrypt: The user in CLC cryptosystem uses his/her
private key skc and the receiver’s public key PKp in PKI
cryptosystem to signcrypt a message m as follows:
1) Choose a number k ∈ Z∗q randomly.
2) Compute R1 = kP , h = H2(m,R1), R2 = hP .
3) Compute c = m⊕H3(R2).
4) Compute u = h−k
xc+d
.
5) Compute V = kPKp.
The ciphertext is σ = (c, u, V ).
Unsigncrypt: The user in PKI cryptosystem uses his/her
private key skp and the sender’s public key PKc in CLC
cryptosystem to unsigncrypt the ciphertext σ = (c, u, V ) as
follows:
1) Compute R1 = skpV .
2) Compute R2 = R1 + u(PKc1 + T + γPpub).
3) Compute m = c⊕H3(R2).
4) Compute h = H2(m,R1).
5) Accept the message if and only if R1 = hP −u(PKc1+
T + γPpub), return ⊥ otherwise.
Now we verify the correctness of the CPHS.
Firstly:
skpV = kskpPKp
= k 1
xp
· xpP
= kP = R1
Secondly:
R1 + u(PKc1 + T + γPpub)
= kP + h−k
xc+d
· (PKc1 + T + γPpub)
= kP + h−k
xc+d
· (xcP + tP + γsP )
= kP + h−k
xc+d
· (xc + d)P
= kP + (h− k)P
= hP =R2
Finally:
hP − u(PKc1 + T + γPpub)
= hP − h−k
xc+d
· (PKc1 + T + γPpub)
= hP − h−k
xc+d
· (xcP + tP + γsP )
= hP − h−k
xc+d
· (xc + d)P
= hP − (h− k)P
= kP =R1
IV. THE SECURITY PROOF OF SCHEMES
In this section, we prove the security of the proposed
schemes.
Theorem 1. (PKI-CLC IND-CCA2-1): In the random oracle
model [28], if an adversary AI has a nonnegligible advantage
ξ against the IND-CCA2-1 security of the PCHS when per-
forming qi queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), there exists
an algorithm through which the challenger C can solve the
CDHP with an advantage ξ∗. Here, ξ∗ ≥ ξ
q12
(1 − qe1c
q1
)(1 −
qe2c
q1
)(1− qu2l ), qe1c denotes partial private key queries of CLC
system, qe2c denotes private key queries of CLC system, and
qu denotes unsigncryption queries.
Proof: To solve a random CDHP instance (P, aP, bP ), C uses
AI as a subroutine. AI should ask for H1 before the identity
IDi is used in any other queries.
Initialization: C initializes and returns the system param-
eters {G1, P, Ppub, n, l,H1, H2, H3} to AI . Next, it picks
a challenged identity α ∈ {1, 2, ..., q1} randomly without
leaking anything about IDα to AI . C needs to maintain the list
of L1˜L3, LKp and LKc that are used to simulate the H1˜H3
hash oracles and the key extraction oracles respectively. Then,
it answers these queries as follows.
Phase 1: AI performs a polynomially bounded number of
queries in an adaptive manner.
1. H1-Queries: When AI presents this query on an
identity IDi, C checks whether the tuple (IDi, Ti, γi) exists
in L1. If so, C returns γi to AI . Otherwise, the public key
query on IDi is made to generate γi to AI subsequently.
2. H2-Queries: For a H2 query, C first checks if
(mi, R1i, hi) has been in L2 previously. If so, C returns the
value hi. Otherwise, C returns a random hi ∈ Z∗q , and adds
new tuple (mi, R1i, hi) to L2.
3. H3-Queries: For a H3 query, C first checks if the
value of H3 query has been in L3 previously. If so, C returns
it. Otherwise, C randomly chooses h3i from {0, 1}n, returns
h3i and adds (R2i, h3i) to L3.
4. PKI Private-Key-Queries: For a private key query on
IDi, C will invoke LKp and search (IDi, xpi, PKpi), then
returns the private key xpi.
5. CLC Partial-Private-Key-Queries: For a partial private
key query on IDi, C makes the following response:
(1) If IDi = IDα, C aborts.
(2) If IDi 6= IDα, C will invoke LKc and search
(IDi, xci, di, Ti, PKc1i), then return the partial private key
di.
6. CLC Private-Key-Queries: For a private key query
above IDi, C responds as follows:
(1) If IDi = IDα, C aborts.
(2) If IDi 6= IDα, C will invoke LKc and search
(IDi, xci, di, Ti, PKc1i), then return (xci, di).
7. CLC Public-Key-Queries: When AI submits a query
on identity IDi for his/her public key, C searches LKc for
the tuple (IDi, xci, di, Ti, PKc1i) and responds as follows:
(1) If the public key exists, C returns (Ti, PKc1i).
(2) If IDi = IDα, C randomly chooses xcα, γα ∈ Z∗q ,
bP ∈ G1 with unknown b, then it sets PKc1α = bP ,
Tα = diαP − γαPpub, where γα = H1(IDα, Tα). C updates
(IDα, xcα, diα, Tα, PKc1α) in LKc and (IDα, Tα, γα) in L1.
(3) If IDi 6= IDα, C selects γi, xci, di ∈ Z∗q randomly.
Next, C calculates PKc1i = bP , Ti = diP − γiPpub,
where γi = H1(IDi, Ti). Then, C updates LKc with
(IDi, xc,i, di, Ti, PKc1i) and L1 with (IDi, Ti, γi).
8. CLC Public-Key-Replacement-Queries: When AI re-
places the public key PKci of the identity IDi with PKci
∗,
C updates LKc with the tuple (IDi, ∅, ∅, Ti, PKci
∗). Here, ∅
denotes an unknown value. The new public key is used by the
challenger to solve the CDHP or is requested by the adversary
in the public key queries.
9. Signcrypt-Queries: Suppose IDsend and IDreceive are
the identities of a sender and a receiver respectively. When AI
makes this query on the tuple (σ, IDsend, IDreceive), C makes
responses as below:
(1) If IDsend 6= IDα, C runs the signcrypt algorithm
normally and sends the ciphertext to AI .
(2) If IDsend = IDα and IDreceive 6= IDα, C finds
(dα, xcα, PKp) from LKc and LKp and generates the ci-
phertext in following steps:
• Choose k ∈ Z∗q randomly, compute R1 = kP ;
• Compute h = H2(m,R1), R2 = hP , store (m,R1, h)
into L2;
• Compute c = m+H3(R2);
• Compute u = h−k
xc+d
, V = kPKp;
• The ciphertext is σ = (c, u, V ).
10. Unsigncrypt-Queries: Upon receiving a unsigncrypt
query of (σ, IDsend, IDreceive), C responds as follows:
(1) If IDreceive 6= IDα, C runs the unsigncrypt algorithm
normally and returns the result.
(2) If IDreceive = IDα, C searches L3 for h3. C
computes m=c ⊕ h3. If and only if R1 = hP − uPKp, the
message is accepted. Otherwise, the ciphertext is rejected.
Challenge phase: AI generates two equal-length plaintexts
m0,m1 and two challenged identities IDsend
∗, IDreceive
∗. In
phase 1, the public key of IDreceive
∗ can not be replaced
and the partial private key queries can not be asked as
well as the secret value. If IDreceive
∗ 6= IDα, C aborts.
Otherwise, C asks public key request oracle on IDsend
∗, sets
receiver’s partial public key to bP (an instance of CDHP)
for an unknown b. Next, C randomly selects T ∈ G1,
k∗ ∈ Z∗q , γ
∗, h∗3 ∈ {0, 1}
n and a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1},
then sets R∗1 = aP , PKc1
∗ = bP , c∗ = mµ ⊕ h
∗
3, computes
V ∗ = k∗PKc1
∗+T +γ∗Ppub and returns (c
∗, u∗, V ∗) to AI .
Phase 2: As in Phase 1, AI will also present adaptively
queries with the limitations of Type I adversary in this
phase. However, (1) AI cannot submit the private key query
on IDreceive
∗. (2) AI cannot ask the partial private key
query on IDsend
∗ if the public key is replaced before the
challenge. (3) AI cannot present the unsigncrypt query on
(σ∗, IDsend
∗, IDreceive
∗).
Guess: In order to get a correct guess, AI should obtain
the outputs R∗1 = aP , PKc1
∗ = bP and V ∗ = k∗PKc1
∗ +
T + γ∗Ppub from the challenge phase. Given an instance
(P, aP, bP ), C can solve CDHP: abP = V ∗ − T − γ∗Ppub.
Probability Analysis: In above discussions, there are four
situations leading to the aborting of C:
• E1: AI asks the partial private key queries of the
challenged identity IDα.
• E2: AI presents the private key queries of the challenged
identity IDα.
• E3: AI does not choose IDα as the receiver’s identity
in the challenge phase.
• E4: C aborts in an unsigncryption query because of
rejecting a valid ciphertext.
Only if C does not reject the game, the CDHP can be solved.
As a result, the probability of C not aborting is: Pr[¬abort] =
Pr[¬E1 ∧ ¬E2 ∧ ¬E3 ∧ ¬E4].
We know that Pr[E1] =
qe1c
q1
, Pr[E2] =
qe2c
q1
, Pr[E3] =
(1− 1
q1
), and Pr[E4] ≤
qu
2l
. Therefore, Pr[¬abort] ≥ 1
q1
(1−
qe1c
q1
)(1− qe2c
q1
)(1 − qu
2l
).
In addition, the probability that C randomly chooses a T
from L1 and outputs it as a solution of CDHP is
1
q1
. In
conclusion, we have ξ∗ ≥ ξ
q12
(1 − qe1c
q1
)(1− qe2c
q1
)(1− qu2l ).
Theorem 2. (PKI-CLC IND-CCA2-2): In the random oracle
model, if an adversary AII has a nonnegligible advantage ξ
against the IND-CCA2-2 security of the PCHS when perform-
ing qi queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), then there exists an
algorithm through which the challenger C can solve the CDHP
with an advantage ξ∗. Here, ξ∗ ≥ ξ
q12
(1− qe2c2l )(1 −
qu
2l ).
The H1˜H3 hash oracles and the key extraction oracles
are similar with PKI-CLC IND-CCA2-1. The second type
adversary AII knows the master key of PKG, but it is not
allowed to replace any user’s public key.
Probability Analysis: In Phase 2, AII can not ask a private
key query on ID∗receive and an unsigncryption query on σ
∗ for
the corresponding plaintext. C will abort the game in following
situations:
• E1: AII asks the private key queries of the challenged
identity IDα .
• E2: AII does not choose IDα as the receiver’s identity
in the challenge phase.
• E3: C aborts in an unsigncryption query because of
rejecting a valid ciphertext.
Only if C does not reject the game, the CDHP can be solved.
As a result, the probability of C not aborting is: Pr[¬abort] =
Pr[¬E1 ∧ ¬E2 ∧ ¬E3].
We know that Pr[E1] =
qe2c
q1
, Pr[E2] = (1 −
1
q1
), and
Pr[E3] ≤
qu
2l
. Therefore, Pr[¬abort] ≥ 1
q1
(1− qe2c
q1
)(1− qu
2l
).
In addition, the probability that C randomly chooses a T
from L1 and outputs it as a solution of CDHP is
1
q1
. In
conclusion, we have ξ∗ ≥ ξ
q12
(1 − qe2c
q1
)(1− qu
2l
).
Theorem 3. (PKI-CLC EUF-CMA): In the random oracle
model, if an adversary F has a nonnegligible advantage ξ
against the EUF-CMA security of the PCHS when performing
qi queries to oracles Hi (i = 1, 2, 3), then there exists an
algorithm through which the challenger C can solve the DLP
with an advantage ξ∗. Here, ξ∗ ≥ ξ
q12
(1 −
qep
2l )(1 −
qs
2l ), qep
denotes private key queries of PKI system and qs denotes
signcryption queries.
Proof: To solve a random DLP instance (P, aP ), C uses F
as a subroutine. F should ask for H1 before the identity IDi
is used in any other queries.
Initialization: C initializes and returns the system param-
eters {G1, P, Ppub, n, l,H1, H2, H3} to F . Next, it picks
a challenged identity α ∈ {1, 2, ..., q1} randomly without
leaking anything about IDα to F . C needs to maintain the list
of L1˜L3, LKp and LKc that are used to simulate the H1˜H3
hash oracles and the key extraction oracles respectively.
Training: F performs a polynomially bounded number of
queries in an adaptive manner. The queries in this phase are
the same as the queries described in Theorem 1.
Forgery: After the training, F outputs a forgery
(σ∗, IDsend
∗, IDreceive
∗). During the training, F cannot
make a private key query on IDsend
∗. If IDsend
∗ 6= IDα,
C aborts. If IDsend
∗ = IDα, C invokes the L1 and LKc to
search γ∗, T ∗, PKc1
∗ and R1. Then, C obtains aPKc1 =
V − T − γPpub and aPKc1
∗ = V − T ∗ − γ∗Ppub. Finally,
C outputs a = [(t−t
∗)+s(γ−γ∗)]
(xc−xc∗)
as the solution of DLP. The
proof is as follows:
aPKc1 − aPKc1
∗
= (V − T − γPpub)− (V − T ∗ − γ∗Ppub)
= (T ∗ − T ) + (γ∗ − γ)Ppub
Probability Analysis: For above discussions, there are three
situations leading to the aborting of C:
• E1: F asks the private key queries of the challenged
identity IDα.
• E2: F does not choose IDα as the sender’s identity in
the challenge phase.
• E3: C aborts in a signcryption query due to the collision
on hash operation.
Only if C does not reject the game, the DLP can be solved.
As a result, the probability of C not aborting is: Pr[¬abort] =
Pr[¬E1 ∧ ¬E2 ∧ ¬E3].
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Fig. 4. The structure diagram of the interprocess communication.
We know that Pr[E1] =
qep
q1
, Pr[E2] = (1 −
1
q1
), and
Pr[E3] ≤
qs
2l . Therefore, Pr[abort] ≥
1
q1
(1− qep
q1
)(1 − qs2l ).
In addition, the probability that F correctly guesses the
hash value of H1 is
1
q1
. In conclusion, we have ξ∗ ≥ ξ
q12
(1−
qep
q1
)(1 − qs
2l
).
The security proof of CPHS is similar to that of PCHS.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we assume that the client is in 5G Mobile
Internet slicing (PKI environment) and the server is in 5G
Vehicle Internet slicing (CLC environment). To simulate the
interprocess communication between the client and the server
in different public cryptosystems. We set up two Raspberry
Pis as the experimental platform. The structure diagram of
the interprocess communication is shown in Fig. 4. and the
simulation results are shown in Fig. 5.
(a) The client (b) The server
Fig. 5. The simulation result between the client and the server.
In the first step, the client generates the public key PKp and
sends it to the server. Also the server receives his/her public
key PKc to the client. In the second step, via the signcryption,
the client generates the ciphertext σ and sends it to the server.
Then, the server unsigncrypts and verifies the ciphertext. If
it is verified, the server sends “Verification Success!” to the
client. In the last step, if the client obtains the response from
the server, it sends “The client has received the result.” to the
server as a reply.
For the theoretical complexity analysis, we compare our
schemes with several existing schemes [24], [25], [26] and
[27] in Table I. Let |G1| and |G2| denote the length of the
elements in group G1 and G2 respectively,
∣
∣Z∗q
∣
∣ denote the
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF EACH SIGNATURE SCHEME
The scheme Key Generation Signcryption Unsigncryption Communication cost Communication Direction
LZT-I[24] 4S+H P+3S+3H+E 3P+2H+E 2|G1|+|m| PKI → IBC
LZT-II[24] 4S+H P+2S+2H+E 3P+S+3H+E 2|G1|+|m| IBC → PKI
LHJ[25] 4S+2H P+3S+3H+E 5P+3H 2|G1|+|m| CLC → IBC
ZZW[26] P+5S+2H P+3S+2H+2E 2P+2S+3H+E 3|G1|+|ID|+|m| IBC → CLC
WLZ[27] 2P+7E 3S+H+4E 5P+2S+H+E 3|G1|+|G2| IBC → PKI
PCHS 4S+H 4S+2H 3S+2H |G1|+|Z
∗
q |+|m| PKI → CLC
CPHS 4S+H 3S+2H 4S+2H |G1|+|Z
∗
q |+|m| CLC → PKI
LZT[24] LHJ[25] ZZW[26] WLZ[27] PCHS
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(a) Time comparison on key generation
LZT[24] LHJ[25] ZZW[26] WLZ[27] PCHS
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
11.419
14.012 13.844 17.027 12.684
94.354
122.609
101.217
132.509
70.050
T
h
e
 C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
a
l 
ti
m
e
 o
n
 S
ig
n
c
ry
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 U
n
s
ig
n
c
ry
p
ti
o
n
(m
s
)
Linux Ubuntu OS
 Rraspberry Pi
(b) Time comparison on signcryption and unsign-
cryption
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Fig. 6. Comparison of time consumption among different schemes.
length of an element in field Z∗q , |m| denote the length of a
message, |ID| denote the the length of a user’s identity. S is
the scalar multiplication in G1, E means the exponentiation
in G2, P denotes the bilinear pairing, H is the hash operation
in Z∗q .
From Table I, we can clearly find that all schemes except
ours use bilinear pairings and exponentiation computations in
the signcryption and unsigncryption stages. Furthermore, com-
pared to the schemes in [24, 25, 26], the scheme [27] involves
more bilinear pairings, which lead to more time consumption.
As for the communication overhead, WLZ [27] is the highest
among these schemes because one of its ciphertext elements
is in group G2. Observing the last column in Table I, we find
that the schemes in [25, 26, 27] are one-way communications,
which have the limitations in practice. The schemes in [24-
27] are only suit for the heterogeneous environments of PKI-
to-IBC or IBC-to-CLC. Our schemes are designed specially
for the mutual heterogeneous communication of PKI-to-CLC
public cryptosystems innovatively.
For the quantitative analysis, we set up two different envi-
ronments for simulation. The first experimental platform is
in Ubuntu OS over an Inter Pentium 2.70 GHz dual core
processor and 1024 MB memory. The second one is in
Raspberry Pi 3B+. The cryptography library we used is PBC-
0.5.14. We choose the type A curve y2 = x3+x in simulation
because the math algorithm is more efficient on exponentiation
in G2. We first assess the cryptographic operations, and each
operation is run 10000 times to eliminate the influence of
random disturbance. The detailed results are shown in Table II.
Generally, the time overhead in Raspberry Pi is about ten times
higher than that in Ubuntu. Furthermore, we also find that the
TABLE II
OPERATING TIME IN DIFFERENT SIMULATION ENVIRONMENTS(MS)
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
❤
Environment
Operation
P S E H
Ubuntu OS 1.396 1.812 0.197 0.001
Raspberry Pi 15.104 10.006 1.955 0.002
time cost on the scalar multiplication is higher than that on
the bilinear pairing in Ubuntu environment, while the result
is opposite in Raspberry Pi platform, which would lead to
the significant changes among schemes in the two simulation
environments.
Before running the schemes, we first test the time consump-
tion on their private/public key pair generation. As shown
in Fig. 6(a), although the time cost on key generation of
each scheme is very close, WLZ [27] achieves the lowest
computation cost in this part because there is no scalar
multiplication but only a few bilinear pairings. Fig. 6(b) shows
the time consumption on the signcryption and unsigncryption
among different schemes in two platforms. Fig. 6(c) indicates
the total overhead of the key generation, the signcryption and
the unsigncryption. As a whole, ZZW [26] has the highest
computational overhead in Ubuntu environment, while WLZ
[27] takes the highest cost in Raspberry Pi platform. Without
any bilinear pairing, our scheme is more efficient on the
computational overhead.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose two signcryption schemes without
the bilinear pairing between PKI and CLC cryptosystems,
which can achieve secure mutual heterogeneous communi-
cations of 5G network slicings. When the users in the 5G
slicing based on PKI environment (such as a Mobile Internet
slicing) try to communicate with the users in the 5G slicing
based on CLC (such as a Vehicle Internet slicing), our schemes
can provide the available and efficient solutions. Meanwhile,
they have the IND-CCA2 under the CDHP and the EUF-CMA
under the DLP in the random oracle model. We also simulate
the interprocess communication between two different public
cryptosystems on Raspberry Pi. Compared to the existing
schemes, our schemes are innovative and more efficient for
heterogeneous communications of 5G network slicings.
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